Muscle or Motivation? A Stop-Signal Study on the Effects of Sequential Cognitive Control by Huizenga, Hilde M. et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 08 May 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00126
Muscle or motivation? A stop-signal study on the effects of
sequential cognitive control
Hilde M. Huizenga
1*, MauritsW. van der Molen
1,Anika Bexkens
1, Marieke G. N. Bos
1 and
Wery P . M. van denWildenberg
1,2
1 Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
2 Amsterdam Center for the Study of Adaptive Control in Brain and Behavior, Amsterdam, Netherlands
Edited by:
Wim Notebaert, Ghent University,
Belgium
Reviewed by:
Wim Notebaert, Ghent University,
Belgium
Eliot Hazeltine, University of Iowa,
USA
*Correspondence:
Hilde M. Huizenga, Department of
Psychology, University of Amsterdam,
Weesperplein 4, 1018XA Amsterdam,
Netherlands.
e-mail: h.m.huizenga@uva.nl
Performance on cognitive control tasks deteriorates when control tasks are performed
together with other control tasks, that is, if simultaneous cognitive control is required. Sur-
prisingly, this is also observed if control tasks are preceded by other control tasks, that is, if
sequential cognitive control is required.The typical explanation for the latter ﬁnding is that
previous acts of cognitive control deplete a common resource, just like a muscle becomes
fatigued after repeated usage. An alternative explanation, however, is that previous acts
of cognitive control reduce motivation to match allocated resources to required resources.
In this paper we formalize these muscle and motivation accounts, and show that they
yield differential predictions regarding the interaction between simultaneous and sequen-
tial cognitive control.These predictions were tested using a paradigm where participants
had to perform multiple stop-signal tasks, which varied in their demands on simultane-
ous and sequential control. Results of two studies supported predictions derived from the
motivation account.Therefore, we conclude that the effects of sequential cognitive control
are best explained in terms of a reduction of motivation to match allocated to required
resources.
Keywords: cognitive control, resource depletion, ego-depletion, motivation, stop-signal task, stimulus response
compatibility, formal models, multilevel analysis
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive control is essential for optimal everyday functioning.
Unfortunately, the capacity for cognitive control is limited, as is
evidenced from tasks that require simultaneous use of multiple
control functions. For example, stop-signal inhibition deterio-
rates in tasks that also require inhibition of distracting stimuli
(e.g., Verbruggen et al., 2005). Surprisingly, not only simultane-
ous, but also sequential demands on cognitive control degrade
performance (Hagger et al., 2010). For example, stop-signal inhi-
bition deteriorates if a preceding task requires control over food
intake (Muraven et al., 2006). The usual account for these effects
of sequentialcognitivecontrol1 isthatsequentialtasksrelyonone
common resource, just as simultaneous tasks do. This common
resource then becomes depleted, as a muscle becomes fatigued
after repeated use (Muraven and Baumeister, 2000). However, an
alternativeaccounthasalsobeenputforward,namelythatsequen-
tial cognitive control reduces motivation to allocate resources
required to meet task demands (Hagger et al., 2010; Robinson
et al.,2010).
Itisunknownwhetherthe“muscle”orthe“motivation”account
provides the best explanation for the effects of sequential cog-
nitive control (Baumeister and Vohs, 2007; Hagger et al., 2010;
Robinson et al., 2010). In the present paper we therefore aim
to test their relative merits. First, we show by means of simple
1Note that in this paper sequential control refers to sequential tasks, and not to
sequential trials within a task.
formal modeling, that the muscle and motivation accounts yield
differential predictions on the interaction between simultaneous
andsequentialcognitivecontrol.Second,wetestthesepredictions
using a paradigm that varied the demands on both simultane-
ous and sequential cognitive control. We do this by focusing on a
key aspect of cognitive control, namely the ability to inhibit pre-
potent motor responses,as assessed in the stop-signal task (Logan
and Cowan, 1984; Logan, 1994).
In the stop-signal task, participants are instructed to make a
speeded binary response to a go signal, for example participants
have to respond left to a left pointing arrow, and right to a right
pointing arrow. Shortly after the onset of the go-signal partici-
pants occasionally receive a stop signal that requires them to stop
thegoresponse.Thestop-taskyieldsseveralinformativeindicesof
performance,amongwhichthetimerequiredtorespondtothego
signal (go reaction time, RT), the percentage of choice errors, i.e.,
responding left if a right-hand response is required and vice versa,
and, most importantly, an estimate of the time required to stop
the response upon presentation of the stop signal (stop signal
reaction time, SSRT, cf. Figure 1). A prolonged SSRT is a reliable
indexof suboptimalinhibitoryperformanceandthusof impaired
cognitive control (Logan and Cowan, 1984; Band et al.,2003).
The effects of simultaneous demands on cognitive control have
been investigated by pairing the stop-signal task with the Erik-
sen ﬂanker task,the Simon task,and with a spatially incompatible
stimulus–response task. In the Eriksen ﬂanker task, a central go
stimulus is surrounded by distracting ﬂankers. These ﬂankers can
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FIGURE 1 | Calculation of stop-signal RT (SSRT) according to the race
model (Logan and Cowan, 1984).The black curve depicts the distribution
of RTs on go trials (i.e., trials without a stop-change signal) representing the
ﬁnishing times of the go process. Assuming independence of the go and
stop processes, the ﬁnishing time of the stop process bisects the go RT
distribution. Given that the response could not be stopped on nth percent
of all stop-change trials (here at 50%), SSRT (200ms) is calculated by
subtracting the mean stop-change signal delay (100ms) from the 50th
percentile of go RT (300ms).
becongruentwiththecorrectresponse,i.e.,boththecentraltarget
andsurroundingﬂankersindicatethecorrectresponse,ortheycan
be incongruent, in which case the incorrect response signaled by
the ﬂankers needs to be inhibited (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). If
thestoptaskispairedwiththeEriksenﬂankertask,SSRTtypically
is increased on incongruent trials compared to congruent trials
(Kramer et al., 1994; Ridderinkhof et al., 1999). In the Simon
task, a go signal is presented at locations that may conﬂict with
the location of the response (Simon, 1969). For example, a left
pointing arrow requiring a left hand response is presented at the
right side of the screen. If the stop task is paired with the Simon
task,SSRTwillincreaseonconﬂicttrials(Verbruggenetal.,2005).
On a spatially incompatible stimulus–response task participants
have to execute a left hand response to a right pointing arrow and
vice versa. Logan and Irwin (2000) observed an increased SSRT
for incompatible as compared to compatible responses, but only
foreyemovementsandnotforhandmovements.vandenWilden-
bergandvanderMolen(2004a,b)alsoobservedaprolongedSSRT
for incompatible as compared to compatible responses, but only
on a selective stop task, when participants had to inhibit to one
stop signal and not to another. Finally,Morein-Zamir et al. (2006)
showed, using an alternative paradigm, that inhibition deterio-
rated if stimulus–response mappings were spatially incompatible.
Insum,thesestudiesindicatethatSSRTincreasesif thestop-signal
task is paired with another task that also requires cognitive con-
trol, although there is mixed evidence for the combined effects of
stopping and stimulus–response incompatibility.
The effects of sequential cognitive control are generally investi-
gated by comparing performance under two conditions. In the
“depletion” condition participants perform a cognitive control
task that is preceded by another cognitive control task. In the
“non-depletion” condition participants perform a cognitive con-
trol task that is preceded by a task that does not require cogni-
tive control. For example, inhibition of emotional expression is
assessed after participants either performed a “depleting” mem-
ory updating task or a “non-depleting” memory maintenance
task (Schmeichel,2007).A recent meta-analysis indicated that the
effectsofsequentialcognitivecontrolareveryrobust:previousacts
of cognitive control diminish performance on a variety of subse-
quently executed cognitive control tasks (Hagger et al., 2010). It
is commonly assumed that effects are limited only to subsequent
tasks that require cognitive control whereas performance on sub-
sequent tasks that do not require cognitive control is not affected
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998). Effects are most pronounced for
tasks that require“hot”control over emotional responses (Hagger
et al., 2010), although a subset of studies also report effects on
“cold”control,as is required in the stop-signal task (e.g.,Muraven
et al.,2006).
While the deleterious effects of sequential tasks requiring cog-
nitive control are quite robust, the underlying mechanism is still
unknown. Both a“muscle”and a“motivation”account have been
proposed. The standard explanation, the muscle account, states
that previous acts of cognitive control deplete a common resource
(Muraven and Baumeister, 2000). This account provides a parsi-
monious explanation for the wealth of studies that ﬁnd effects of
sequential cognitive control. The alternative motivation account
states that previous acts of cognitive control reduce motivation
to allocate resources to meet current task demands (Hagger et al.,
2010;Robinsonetal.,2010).Consistentwiththisinterpretation,it
hasbeenshownthatincreasingmotivationalincentivesreducesthe
detrimental effects of sequential cognitive control (Muraven and
Slessareva, 2003). In addition, these effects are reduced if motiva-
tionisprimed(Martijnetal.,2007)orifthedepletingtaskisintrin-
sically motivating (Muraven et al., 2008). Thus the motivation
account may provide a viable alternative to the muscle account.
The aim of the present paper therefore is to test the relative merits
of the muscle and motivation account. In order to do so, we ﬁrst
derive simple formal models of these two competing accounts.
SIMPLE FORMAL MODELS OF MUSCLE AND MOTIVATION
ACCOUNTS
In this section, we derive simple formal models for the muscle
and motivation accounts. We do this by considering the situa-
tion in which participants have to perform two versions of the
stop-signal task that vary both in their demands on simultane-
ous control and in their demands on sequential control. We will
show that the muscle and motivation accounts yield differential
predictions regarding the interaction between simultaneous and
sequential cognitive control.
Demandsonsimultaneouscontrolweremanipulatedbyhaving
participants perform a task using a compatible stimulus–response
mapping and a task with an incompatible mapping; the latter
task thus requires simultaneous cognitive control (Logan and
Irwin, 2000; van den Wildenberg and van der Molen, 2004a,b;
Morein-Zamir et al., 2006). Task order was randomized between
participants. The factor Task is dummy coded as 0 (compatible
task) and 1 (incompatible task). Presentation order is denoted by
the factor Order, which is dummy coded as 0 (ﬁrst task) and 1
(second task)2.
2If thedesignincludesmoretasks,forexamplenotonlyacompatibleandanincom-
patible task but also a task with an arbitrary mapping, two dummy variables are
required for Task, and two for Order.
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A common assumption in resource theory (e.g., Kahneman,
1973;Sarteretal.,2006;Pessoa,2009)isthatcognitivecontrolper-
formancewilldecreaseif allocatedresourcesdonotmeetrequired
resources. This assumption is supported by studies in which allo-
catedresourcesweremanipulated,forexamplebyrequiringsimul-
taneous cognitive control (e.g., Kramer et al., 1994; Ridderinkhof
et al., 1999; Logan and Irwin, 2000; van den Wildenberg and
van der Molen, 2004a,b; Verbruggen et al., 2005; Morein-Zamir
et al.,2006).We therefore assume that SSRT,an index of cognitive
control, will increase if allocated resources do not meet required
resources:
SSRT = β0 + (required resource − allocated resource), (1)
where the constant β0 denotes SSRT if there is a perfect match
between required and allocated resources. Note that we assume
that SSRT is a linear function of the discrepancy between
required and allocated resources. We might have assumed a
non-linear function f: SSRT=β0+f (required resource-allocated
resource). However, the functional form of the relationship
betweenresourcesandperformanceisdifﬁculttodetermine.More
speciﬁcally,there is no evidence to suggest an adequate functional
form for the relationship between resources and SSRT (e.g., Nor-
man and Bobrow, 1975; Logan, 1997). Therefore we assume, for
reasons of convenience, a linear function.
The required resource in Eq. 1 is a function of task:
Required resource = β1 + β2 ∗ Task. (2)
Since Task is dummy coded as 0 (compatible) and 1 (incom-
patible), β1 denotes the resource required for the compatible task
and β2 denotes the task effect, which is expected to be positive.
That is,incompatible tasks are expected to require more resources
than compatible tasks.
Boththemuscleandthemotivationaccountssharetheassump-
tions underlying Eqs 1 and 2, yet they differ in their assumptions
concerning allocated resources. The muscle model assumes that
eithertaskorderorthecontroldemandsof theprevioustaskaffect
allocatedresources.Themotivationmodelassumesthattaskorder
affects the motivation to match allocated resources to required
resources. We will show that these assumptions yield mutually
exclusive predictions on the interaction between task and order.
MUSCLE MODEL
Themeta-analysisbyHaggeretal.(2010)indicatesthattheeffects
of sequential cognitive control mainly originate in the fact that
a cognitive control task is preceded by another cognitive control
task, the control demand of this preceding task is of no inﬂu-
ence. However, a meta-analysis is necessarily based on a between
study comparison of demanding and less demanding depleting
tasks. Such a between study comparison may not be very power-
ful, and therefore we will account for the possibility that control
demands of the previous task are of inﬂuence. That is, we present
two muscle models. In the ﬁrst muscle model, consistent with
Hagger et al., task order affects allocated resources. In the second
muscle model, cognitive control demands of previous tasks affect
allocated resources.
Muscle model 1: task order affects allocated resources
In the ﬁrst muscle model, Order determines the amount of
resources allocated to the current task:
Allocated resource = β3 + β4 ∗ Order. (3)
Since Order is dummy coded as 0 (ﬁrst task) and 1 (second task),
β3istheallocatedresourceintheﬁrsttaskandβ4theOrdereffect,
whichisexpectedtobenegative;thatis,lessresourcesareallocated
to the second as compared to the ﬁrst task. Substitution of Eqs 2
and 3 into (1) yields:
SSRT = (β0 + β1 − β3) + β2 ∗ Task − β4 ∗ Order. (4)
This model thus predicts a main effect of Task, a main effect of
Order, yet no interaction. That is, Task effects do not increase or
decrease with increasing Order.
Muscle model 2: control demand preceding task affects allocated
resources
In the second muscle model,the control demand of the preceding
task determines resources allocated to the current task. By design,
a demanding task is necessarily preceded by a less demanding
task,andthereforereceivesrelativelyhighresources,whereasaless
demandingtaskisprecededbyademandingask,andthusreceives
relatively low resources. Consequently, this model predicts that
task effects decrease with increasing Order.
Morespeciﬁcally,allocatedresourceisafunctionof thecontrol
demands of the previous task, therefore, we do not only have to
include an effect of Order as in Eq. 3,but also an interaction effect
of Order and Task:
Allocated resource = β5 + β6 ∗ Order + β7 ∗ Order ∗ Task (5)
Remember,Orderisdummycodedas0(ﬁrsttask)and1(second
task), Task is dummy coded as 0(compatible) and 1(incompati-
ble).Therefore,β5,denotesresourcesallocatedtotheﬁrsttask,this
parameterisexpectedtobepositive.Theparameterβ6denotesthe
order effect (if the current task is compatible), it is expected that
less resources are allocated to a second as compared to a ﬁrst task,
thereforethisparameterisexpectedtobenegative.Theparameter
β7 is the additional order effect if the current task is incompati-
ble. Since the incompatible task is preceded by the less demanding
compatible task,this parameter is expected to be positive.
Substituting of Eqs 5 and 2 into 1 yields:
SSRT = β0+(β1+β2∗Task)−(β5+β6∗Order+β7∗Order∗Task)
That is:
SSRT = β0+β1−β5+β2∗Task−β6∗Order−β7∗Order∗Task (6)
This model thus predicts main effects of Task and Order and
an interaction between Task and Order. Since β2i se x p e c t e dt ob e
positive and (−β7) is expected to be negative, it is expected that
Task effects will decrease with increasing Order.
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MOTIVATION MODEL
Baumeister andVohs (2007) indicated that motivation is required
on cognitive control tasks “to achieve the goal or meet the stan-
dard.”We therefore assume that a motivated individual will try to
match allocated resources to required resources. More speciﬁcally,
we assume that allocated resources are a proportion of required
resources, and that this proportion increases with increasing
motivation.
Robinson et al. (2010) argued that performing one cognitive
control task may reduce motivation to allocate resources to a
second cognitive control task. This is supported by the observa-
tion that the detrimental effects of sequential cognitive control
are reduced in the presence of extrinsic or intrinsic motivation
(Muraven and Slessareva, 2003; Muraven et al., 2008) or if moti-
vation is primed (Martijn et al., 2007). We therefore assume that
motivation to allocate resources decreases with increasing task
order.
Given these assumptions, allocated resources are a fraction of
required resources, where this fraction decreases with increasing
Order. More speciﬁcally:
Allocated resource = β8 ∗ required resource
+ β9 ∗ required resource ∗ Order (7)
Since Order is dummy coded as 0 (ﬁrst task) and 1 (second
task),β8 denotes the fraction of required resource allocated to the
ﬁrsttask,whichisbetweenzeroandone,andβ9denotestheOrder
effect on this fraction, which is expected to be between −1 and 0.
Required resource is deﬁned in Eq. 2, its substitution into Eq. 7
yields:
Allocated resource = β8 ∗ (β1 + β2 ∗ Task)
+ β9 ∗ (β1 + β2 ∗ Task) ∗ Order (8)
Substitution of Eqs 2 and 8 into 1 yields:
SSRT = (β0 + β1 − β8 ∗ β1) + β2 ∗ (1 − β8) ∗ Task









Although all models predict main effects of Task and Order, they
differ in their predictions concerning the interaction of Task and
Order.Theﬁrstmusclemodelpredictsthataninteractionisabsent,
the second muscle model predicts that Task effects decrease with
increasingOrder,whereasthemotivationmodelpredictsthatTask
effects increase with increasing Order.
In study 1 we tested these predictions by having participants
perform on three consecutive stop-signal tasks that varied in their
demands on simultaneous cognitive control; a compatible stop
task, an incompatible stop task, and a stop task in which the
mapping between stimulus and response is arbitrary. The latter
taskwasincludedtoincreasevariationinbothtaskandorderand,
thus, to increase the power of tests of their main and interaction
effects.
STUDY 1 – METHODS
Participants
Thirty-four young healthy adults (23 women and 11 men, M
Age=21.10 SD=3.78years) participated in this experiment for
course credit or a ﬁnancial reward. All participants provided




ware (Neurobehavioral Systems,www.neurobs.com). Participants
were instructed to respond quickly and accurately in response to
the identity of white, 8mm high, go stimuli that were centrally
presented against a gray screen background (go trials). Man-
ual responses were made by pressing the “z” or “?” keys of the
QWERTY computer keyboard with the left and right index ﬁnger,
respectively.
Study 1 consisted of a 1-h 30 session in which participants
completed three versions of the stop-signal paradigm (Logan and
Cowan,1984;Logan,1994). Under the compatible and incompat-
ible conditions, the go stimuli consisted of left and right pointing
brackets(“<”and“>”),whereasthearbitrarygotaskincorporated
X and O stimuli. Participants were instructed to respond with the
hand indicated by the bracket (compatible task), or to respond
withtheotherhand(incompatibletask).Inthearbitrarytask,sub-
jectspressedlefttoanOandrighttoanX(orviceversa).Orderof
the three conditions was counterbalanced between participants.
Go stimuli were presented pseudo-randomly, with the con-
straint that they signaled left- and right-hand responses equally
often. The presentation of go signals was response-terminated or
presented with a maximum of 1975ms. Intervals between subse-
quent go signals varied randomly but equiprobably, from 1525 to
1975ms in steps of 50ms. During these inter-stimulus intervals,a
white ﬁxation cross (3mm in diameter) was presented.
Unpredictably, the white go-signal changed to red on 25% of
the trials, upon which the response had to be inhibited (stop tri-
als).Astaircase-trackingproceduredynamicallyadjustedthedelay
between the onset of the stop signal to control inhibition proba-
bility(Levitt,1971).Thatis,afterasuccessfullyinhibitedstoptrial,
stop-signaldelayonthenextstoptrialincreasedby50ms,whereas
the stop-signal delay decreased by 50ms on the next stop trial
when the participant was unable to stop. The initial stop-signal
delay was set to 200ms, the minimum and maximal delay were
50 and 950ms respectively. This algorithm ensured that responses
were successfully inhibited in about half of the stop trials.
Stop signal reaction time was estimated using the integration
method (Logan,1994; Band et al.,2003,p. 215; cf. Figure1). Esti-
mation of SSRT relies on the race model which assumes indepen-
dence between going and stopping processes (Logan and Cowan,
1984). If the latency of go-signal processing is affected by stop-
signalprocessing,thentheassumptionof“functional”or“context”
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independence is violated (e.g., Logan, 1994; Ridderinkhof et al.,
1999; Band et al., 2003). Simulation studies by Band et al. (2003)
showed that the race model yields reliable estimates of SSRT
despite context dependence between stopping and going (cf.,Rid-
derinkhof et al., 1999). The premise of “stochastic”independence
seems more critical (Logan and Cowan, 1984; Logan, 1994). Sto-
chastic independence refers to the condition that stopping and
going are not correlated (i.e., go RT and SSRT are independent
random variables).Again,extensive simulation studies performed
by Band et al. (2003) demonstrated that the race model is quite
robust, even against violations of stochastic independence.
Each of the three stop-task versions consisted of ﬁve blocks of
96trials,theﬁrstofwhichservedasapracticeblocktoobtainstable
performance. This is especially important to avoid negative carry-
over effects between compatible and non-compatible tasks. After
each block, mean go RT, SD of mean go RT, percentage correct
responses and percentage unsuccessful inhibitions were presented
on screen. To ensure that the tracking algorithm worked properly,
participants were given additional feedback when the percentage
of failed inhibition was below 30% or above 70%. In case failed
inhibits were below 30% participants were instructed to react as
fast as possible to go stimuli. In case of failed inhibits above 70%
participants were instructed to keep reacting as fast as possible to
the go stimuli, but also to try and withhold their response to the
stop stimuli.
Data analysis
The dependent variable of primary interest was SSRT. In addition
we analyzed go RT and the percentage of choice errors. The lat-
ter two dependent variables were included to test the assumption
that effects of order are limited to a decline in cognitive control
processes and do not extend to more basic processes like respond-
ing to the go stimulus (Baumeister et al., 1998). Task and Order
served as independent variables. The design cannot be analyzed
using a regular factorial repeated measures ANOVA since each
task is only administered once, i.e., there would be many missing
values. This design can be analyzed,however,in a straightforward
mannerbyamultilevelanalysis(e.g.,SnijdersandBosker,1999)as
implementedinSPSSMIXED3.Allstatisticaltestsweretwo-tailed.
STUDY 1 – RESULTS
NoSSRToutliers(beloworabove3SD’softhemean)werepresent
and therefore all data were analyzed.Analyses included the factors
Task and Order and their two-way interaction.
Figure 2, left hand panel, shows SSRT as a function of Task
and Order. There was a main effect of Task [F(2, 24.5)=3.57,
p =0.04].SSRTwasprolongedonarbitrary(p =0.03)andincom-
patible tasks (p =0.02) as compared to the compatible task, with
no further differences between tasks. There was a main effect of
Order[F(2,66.34)=4.36,p =0.02],SSRTwasincreasedfororder
3( p <0.01) as compared to order 1, with no further signiﬁcant
differences. The crucial interaction between Task and Order was
not signiﬁcant [F(4,62.54)=1.04,p =0.39]. However,follow-up
tests for each level of Order,separately,indicated that a Task effect
wasonlypresentatorder3[F(2,21.24)=4.87,p =0.02]4.Thatis,
fororder3SSRTwasincreasedfortheincompatibletask(p =0.02)
and the arbitrary task (p =0.04) as compared to the compatible
task, with no further differences between tasks (cf. Figure 2). In
sum,these results indicate that SSRT lengthened on arbitrary and
incompatible tasks (Task effect) and that SSRT was enhanced for
the ﬁnal task relative to the preceding tasks (Order effect). The
results indicate that the Task effect was only present for order
3, although the omnibus Task∗Order interaction effect was not
signiﬁcant.
3Theerrorcovariancestructurewasleftunspeciﬁed,justasinaregularmultivariate
approach to a repeated measures ANOVA. That is no sphericity or other restrictive
assumptionswereimposedontheTaskcovariancestructure.Estimateswerederived
by Maximum Likelihood.
4Analyses at each level of Order separately may yield unstable estimates of the Task
covariance structure. Therefore, all such analyses were repeated with a diagonal
covariance matrix,which yielded comparable results.
FIGURE 2 | Mean SSRT (error bars denote±1SEM) as a function ofTask
(compatible, arbitrary 1 or incompatible) and as a function of task order
(either ﬁrst, second, or third task).The left hand panel concerns study 1, the
middle panel study 2, session 1 and the right-hand panel study 2, session 2.
www.frontiersin.org May 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 126 | 5Huizenga et al. Muscle or motivation?
There was a main effect of Task on go RT [F(2,32.59)=12.11,
p <0.01]. Go RT was longer for the arbitrary task,as compared to
the compatible (p <0.01) and incompatible (p <0.01) task, with
no further differences between tasks. There was a main effect of
Order [F(2,62.26)=5.69,p <0.01],Go RT was shorter for order
3,as compared to order 2 (p <0.01) and order 1 (p =0.02),while
the latter two did not differ. The interaction between Task and
Orderwasnotsigniﬁcant[F(4,56.57)=1.81,p =0.14].Follow-up
tests for each level of Order separately, yielded no effects of Task.
There was a main effect of Task on percentage of choice errors
[F(2,33.77)=6.03,p =0.01],this percentage was higher for arbi-
trary (p =0.01) and incompatible (p <0.01) tasks as compared
to the compatible task, with no further differences between tasks.
There was no main effect of Order [F(2, 39.91)=1.40, p =0.26],
nor an interaction between Task and Order [F(4, 55.71)=0.07,
p =0.99].
In sum, the results on go RT and percentage of choice errors
indicate that the basic go process is not affected by increasing
Order. On the contrary,go RT was shortest on the ﬁnal task while
accuracy was maintained.
STUDY 1 – DISCUSSION
The two muscle models and the motivation model yield differ-
ential predictions on the interaction between Task and Order.
The ﬁrst muscle model,assuming that allocated resources depend
on task order, does not predict such an interaction. The second
muscle model, assuming that allocated resources depend on the
cognitive control demands of the previous task, predicts that task
effects decrease with increasing order. The motivation model, in
which task order determines the motivation to match allocated
resources to required resources, predicts that task effects increase
with increasing order.
Theresultsof Study1donotsupportthesecondmusclemodel.
Consistent with the meta-analytic results of Hagger et al. (2010),
the effects of sequential cognitive control do not depend on the
cognitive control demands of the previous task. The results of
Study 1 do not allow for a decisive conclusion regarding the rel-
ative merits of the ﬁrst muscle model and the motivation model.
As predicted by the ﬁrst muscle model, the omnibus interaction
between Task and Order was absent. However,as predicted by the
motivationmodel,follow-upanalysesdidindicatethatTaskeffects
on SSRT were most pronounced, and actually were only present,
for the third task.
Stop signal reaction time did not only lengthen if the stimulus
response mapping was incompatible as compared to compatible,
but also when the mapping was arbitrary (i.e., respond left to O
and respond right to X). Two explanations have been put forward
for the observation that arbitrary mappings are more difﬁcult to
inhibit than compatible mappings (Huizenga et al., 2009). First,
an arbitrary mapping may initially activate competing responses
associated with both hands, responses that need to be inhib-
ited until the appropriate mapping is determined. On stop trials,
this inhibitory mechanism then competes with stop-signal inhibi-
tion for common resources. Second, maintenance of an arbitrary
stimulus–response rule in memory may require cognitive con-
trol resources in addition to the resources needed for stopping.
Maintenance of an arbitrary rule then competes with inhibitory
functioning for common resources. Note however, that mainte-
nance of information in memory is generally not considered as
a component of cognitive control, in contrast to the manipula-
tion of information in memory. For example, digit span forward,
which only requires maintenance, is not considered as a cognitive
control task,whereas digit span backward,which requires manip-
ulation,is considered as a cognitive control task (e.g.,Schmeichel,
2007). Therefore the second interpretation offered above is not
very plausible. Notwithstanding this theoretical argument, it still
is necessary to test these two explanations empirically.
STUDY 2
The ﬁrst study did not yield conclusive evidence supporting the
ﬁrst muscle model vs. the motivation model. That is, an omnibus
interaction effect of Task and Order was lacking, supporting the
ﬁrst muscle model, whereas follow-up tests did indicate that Task
effects were only present for order 3, supporting the motivation
model. The absence of an omnibus interaction effect on SSRT
might be due to the fact that our compatibility manipulation was
not very effective. Participants were required to respond to the
direction indicated by centrally presented arrows (i.e., symbolic
mapping manipulation) rather than the location of the stimu-
lus itself; e.g., left- vs. right-positioned stimuli requiring a left vs.
right response, or vice versa (i.e., spatial mapping manipulation).
A spatial mapping manipulation might yield more pronounced
differences between compatible and incompatible tasks (cf. Logan
and Irwin, 2000, eye movement condition).Therefore, in our sec-
ondstudyweusedaspatialmappingmanipulation.Ifthisstronger
manipulation does not yield an interaction between Task and
Order, this will provide evidence for the ﬁrst muscle model. If it
does yield an interaction,more speciﬁcally,if Task effects increase
with increasing Order, this will yield evidence for the motivation
model.
Theﬁrststudyindicatedthatarbitrarystimulusresponsemap-
pings were more difﬁcult to inhibit than compatible mappings.
This might be due to the fact that arbitrary mappings require
cognitive control resources to inhibit competing responses until
the mapping is determined. Alternatively, it might be due to the
fact that cognitive control resources are required to maintain a




levels in which either one, two, or three characters were mapped
to each response hand. If this manipulation does not affect SSRT,
it provides evidence for the response competition explanation. If
this manipulation would affect SSRT, it provides support for the
memory explanation.
Our second study thus featured ﬁve stop-signal tasks: a spatial
compatible task, a spatial incompatible task and three arbitrary
tasks that differed in memory load. These tasks were presented in
two sessions on separate days. Inclusion of two sessions allows for
an additional test of the muscle vs. motivation models. According
tomusclemodels,resourceswouldbereplenishedatthebeginning
of the second session, since people had the opportunity to rest
(TylerandBurns,2008)andtoeat(Gailliotetal.,2007).Therefore
a session effect, more speciﬁcally, a decrease in cognitive control
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ing order. If so, this would provide evidence for the motivation
model. Second, we investigated whether arbitrary memory load
affects SSRT. If so, this would provide evidence for the memory
maintenance,insteadof responsecompetition,explanationof dif-
ﬁculties in inhibiting arbitrary mappings. Finally, we determined
whether session affects SSRT. If so, this will provide additional
evidence for the motivation model.
STUDY 2 – METHODS
Participants
Forty-one young healthy adults (25 women and 16 men, M
Age=22.95 SD=6.01years) participated in this experiment for
course credit or a ﬁnancial reward, they did not participate in
Study 1. All participants provided informed consent. The study
was approved by the local ethics committee.
Stop-signal task
Task characteristics are similar to those of Study 1, except for the
following modiﬁcations. Participants performed ﬁve stop-signal
tasks. In the spatially compatible task, go stimuli consisted of
a + sign presented either 1.6cm left or right of ﬁxation point,
and participants were instructed to execute a spatially compatible
response. The same stimuli were used in the spatially incompati-
bletaskbutparticipantsweretheninstructedtoexecuteaspatially
incompatible response. In the arbitrary task with a memory load
of 1,anXorOwaspresented,wereeachcharacterwasmappedon
one response hand. In the arbitrary task with a memory load of 2,
an H and S were mapped on one response hand and a W and T
on the other response hand. In the arbitrary task with a memory
load of 3 an M,Y, and U were mapped on one response hand and
an A,I,andV on the other. All characters were symmetrical along
the vertical axis,and thus unrelated to response side.
Stop-task version (compatible, arbitrary 1, arbitrary 2, arbi-
trary 3 and incompatible) was counterbalanced between subjects.
The experiment consisted of two sessions on separate days. Par-
ticipants were free to choose whether they would perform two or
three tasks during the ﬁrst session.
Data analysis
The data analysis proceeded along the same lines as in Study 1.
AgainwedidnotonlyanalyzeSSRT,butalsogoRTandpercentage
of choice errors,to determine whether effects of sequential cogni-
tive control were conﬁned to cognitive control processes (SSRT)
or extended to more primary processes (Go RT and percentage of
choice errors).
STUDY 2 – RESULTS
Data of three participants were removed because SSRT exceeded 3
SD around the mean5. The analysis included effects of Task (ﬁve
5One participant had short SSRT in the arbitrary 2 task (third task, ﬁrst session).
One participant had long SSRT in compatible (ﬁrst task ﬁrst session) and incom-
patible (second task second session) tasks. One participant had short SSRT in the
levels),Order(threelevels),Session(twolevels),andtheirtwoand
three way interactions.
Figure 2, middle and right-hand panel, depicts SSRT as a
function of Task, Order, and Session. There was a main effect
of Task on SSRT [F(4, 47.69)=3.91, p <0.01]. SSRT was longer
for the incompatible task, as compared to the compatible task
(p <0.01), the arbitrary 2 task (p =0.02), and the arbitrary 3
task (p <0.01). All other differences between tasks were non-
signiﬁcant. More speciﬁcally,and important for our second ques-
tion, the arbitrary tasks did not differ signiﬁcantly from each
other (all p-values >0.1). There was a main effect of Order
[F(2, 99.10)=16.54, p <0.01]. SSRT tended to be longer for
Order 2 than Order 1 (p =0.09) and was longer for Order
3 as compared to Order 2 (p <0.01) and Order 1 (p <0.01).
Important for our third question, there was a Session effect;
SSRT was longer for the second as compared to the ﬁrst session
[F(1, 119.14)=26.29, p <0.01]. Crucially for our ﬁrst question,
there was an interaction effect between Task and Order [F(8,
68.74)=3.11, p <0.01]. Follow-up tests for each level of Order,
separately, indicated that there was no Task effect associated with
O r d e r1[ F(4, 10.88)=1.86, p =0.19] nor for Order 2 [F(4,
10.27)=2.36, p =0.12], but there was a nearly signiﬁcant Task
effect for Order 3 [F(4, 14.39)=2.87, p =0.06]. Follow-up tests
for Order 3 indicated that SSRT associated with the incompatible
task was signiﬁcantly lengthened as compared to the compati-
ble task (p =0.04) and the arbitrary 2 (p <0.01) and arbitrary
3( p =0.02) tasks. In addition, SSRT on the arbitrary 1 task was
signiﬁcantly longer as compared to the arbitrary 2 task (p =0.04),
with no further differences between tasks. All other interactions
were non-signiﬁcant.
To summarize, these results indicate that Task effects on SSRT
increase with increasing Order, yielding support for the moti-
vation model. Second, arbitrary memory load does not affect
SSRT, yielding support for the response competition explanation
of prolonged SSRT for arbitrary mappings. Third, there was a
pronounced session effect, which provides further evidence for
the motivation model.
Obviously, there was a main effect of Task on go RT [F(4,
44.22)=52.80, p <0.01]. Go RT was longer on the incompati-
ble task than on the compatible task (p <0.01), and was longer
on arbitrary tasks than on the incompatible and compatible tasks
(all ps<0.01). Go RT increased with arbitrary memory load (all
ps<0.01), except for the difference between the arbitrary 2 and
arbitrary 3 condition, which was not signiﬁcant. The main effect
ofOrderdidnotreachsigniﬁcance[F(2,105.66)=2.61,p =0.08].
Follow-up tests indicated, however, that Go RT was signiﬁcantly
longer on the ﬁrst as compared to the third task (p <0.01). Go RT
was also signiﬁcantly longer in the ﬁrst as compared to the second
session[F(1,113.27)=8.90,p <0.01].Allotherinteractionswere
not signiﬁcant.
Obviously,there was a main effect of Task on the percentage of
choice errors [F(4, 45.37)=17.81, p <0.01]. Percentage of errors
washigheronthearbitrarythanonthecompatibleandincompat-
ibletasks(allps<0.01)andincreasedwitharbitrarymemoryload
compatible task (ﬁrst task ﬁrst session). In these cases data were removed not only
from the SSRT analysis, but also from the Go RT and percentage errors analysis.
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(allps<0.05),exceptforthearbitrary2andarbitrary3condition,
which did not differ signiﬁcantly. There were no signiﬁcant main
effects of Order nor of Session. There was, however, a signiﬁcant
interactionbetweenTaskandOrder[F(8,70.04)=2.59,p =0.02].
Follow-up tests for each level of Order, separately, indicated that
task effects were present at each level. All other interactions were
not signiﬁcant.
In sum, the results for go RT and percentage of choice errors
indicatethatrepeatedsequentialcontrol,eitherwithinorbetween
sessions,does not degrade Go Task performance. On the contrary,
go RT decreased from Order 1 to Order 3, and from Session 1 to
Session 2. This speeding of responses was not accompanied by an
increase in the percentage of choice errors.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Two explanations have been put forward for the recurrent ﬁnding
that performance on cognitive control tasks is degraded if such
tasks are preceded by other tasks that also require cognitive con-
trol.Themuscleaccountstatesthatacommonresourceisdepleted,
just as a muscle becomes fatigued,after repeated usage. The moti-
vationaccountstatesthatrepeatedactsof cognitivecontrolreduce
motivation to match allocated resources to required resources.
The current study demonstrates that these two accounts can
be tested using a paradigm where the demands on simultaneous
and sequential cognitive control are varied systematically, that is,
where both the factor task and the factor order are manipulated.
We have formulated two muscle models, one in which allocated
resources depend on order and one in which allocated resources
depend on the cognitive control demand of previous tasks. In
addition we have formulated a motivation model in which the
motivation to match allocated resources to required resources is
affected by order. We have shown that these three models yield
differential predictions on the interaction between task and order.
Morespeciﬁcally,theﬁrstmusclemodeldoesnotpredictaninter-
action,thesecondmusclemodelpredictsthattaskeffectsdecrease
with increasing order, and the motivation model predicts that
task effects increase with increasing order. Thus this formaliza-
tionofferedthepossibilitytotesttherelativemeritsof muscleand
motivation accounts.
In addition, we have argued that the muscle and motivation
account yield different predictions on the effects of cognitive
control tasks performed in two separate sessions. A decrease in
cognitive control performance over sessions would be inconsis-
tent with the muscle account, whereas it would not necessarily
be inconsistent with the motivation account, thus offering an
additional test of the relative merits of these two accounts.
These predictions were tested in two studies where partici-
pants had to perform a series of stop-signal tasks varying in their
demandsonsimultaneouscognitivecontrol.Theadvantageof the
stop-signal task over other cognitive control tasks is that it does
not only yield an index of cognitive control functioning (SSRT),
but also yields indices of more basic processes (go RT and per-
centage of errors). In this manner it is possible to assess whether
the effects of sequential cognitive control are conﬁned to control
processes or extend also to more basic go processes.
The ﬁrst study did not yield a signiﬁcant task by order interac-
tion on SSRT, supporting the muscle account, yet it did indicate
that task effects were most pronounced on the ﬁnal task, sup-
porting the motivation account. The task by order interaction
was present in the second study: as predicted by the motivation
account, task effects increased with increasing order. In addition,
the second study allowed for a test of session effects, which indi-
cated that SSRT was prolonged during the second as compared
to the ﬁrst session, which provides additional evidence for the
motivation account.
Collectively, these results suggest that the effects of sequential
cognitive control are better explained by the motivation account
than by the muscle account. This is in line with studies observing
negligible effects of sequential cognitive control under condi-
tions where motivation was enhanced or primed (Muraven and
Slessareva, 2003; Martijn et al., 2007; Muraven et al., 2008)s e e
also (Hagger et al., 2010; Robinson et al., 2010). Together these
results suggest that it is more likely that the effects of sequential
cognitive control originate in a depletion of motivation to match
allocatedresourcestorequiredresources,thaninameredepletion
of resources itself.
It might be argued that the effects of order on inhibition are
not due to the effects of sequential cognitive control, but rather
to carry-over effects between sequential compatible and incom-
patible tasks. However, this alternative explanation is not very
plausible. First, we trained participants before each task, to rule
out carry-over effects. Second, if such negative carry-over effects
would be present, this should be evidenced by a lengthening of




It might also be argued that the effects of order on inhibitory
performance are related to automatization of primary task per-
formance, as go RT decreased with order. That is, repeated pre-
sentationof astimulus–responsemappingcanresultinautomatic
associations that may be more difﬁcult to inhibit (Schneider and
Shiffrin, 1977). However, it has been shown that automaticity
of stimulus–response mappings does not interfere with response
inhibitionasassessedbySSRT(Logan,1982;CohenandPoldrack,
2008). In addition, in our studies, stimulus–response mappings
differ between tasks,therefore it is not very likely that associations
becameautomatic.Thereforewedonotconsideritverylikelythat
this alternative explanation in terms of automaticity holds.
In addition to our main ﬁnding, four other ﬁndings are worth
mentioning. First, the results from both studies indicate that the
detrimental effects of order and session on cognitive control per-
formance (SSRT) are not paralleled by effects on more basic
processesasindexedbygoRTanderrorproportion.Thisprovides
evidence for the common assumption that the effects of sequen-
tial cognitive control are conﬁned to cognitive control processes
and do not extend to more basic processes (e.g.,Baumeister et al.,
1998).
Second,we tested two explanations for the Study 1 ﬁnding that
arbitrary mappings were more difﬁcult to inhibit than compati-
ble mappings. First, an arbitrary mapping may require cognitive
control resources to maintain a mapping in memory. Second,
an arbitrary mapping may require cognitive control resources to
inhibitbothresponsehandsuntilthemappingisdetermined.The
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resultssupportthesecondexplanationsinceSSRTwasnotaffected
by a manipulation of memory load. Note, however, that in our
secondstudy,employingaspatialinsteadof asymbolicmanipula-
tion of compatibility, arbitrary mappings were not more difﬁcult
to inhibit than compatible mappings. This suggests that stopping
responses to spatially compatible stimuli takes longer than stop-
ping responses to symbolically compatible stimuli, a suggestion,
which should be addressed in future empirical studies.
Third, SSRT was longer on incompatible as compared to com-
patibletasks.Inpreviousstudies,effectsofstimulusresponsecom-
patibility on SSRT were only found in relatively demanding situ-
ations, such as for inhibition of eye and not for hand movements
(LoganandIrwin,2000)andforselectiveandnotfornon-selective
inhibition (van den Wildenberg and van der Molen, 2004a,b). In
the present study we only observed signiﬁcant effects of compati-
bilityinthethirdtask.Thisﬁndingtogetherwithpreviousﬁndings
indicates that effects of stimulus response compatibility on SSRT
only become evident in demanding situations.
Fourth, although the task, order, and interaction effects in the
ﬁrst and second study are qualitatively similar, SSRT seems to
be prolonged in the second study, even in its ﬁrst session (cf.
Figure 2, compare left and middle panel). Since studies differed
in the number of tasks, a potential explanation for this ﬁnding is
that participants may allocate less resources, yielding a prolonged
SSRT, if the number of prospective tasks increases (cf. Muraven
et al.,2006; Tyler and Burns, 2009).
Thecurrentresultshaveseveralbroaderimplications.First,the
present studies indicate that effects of sequential cognitive con-
trol can be found in a relatively “cold” cognitive control task, the
stop-signal task. The effects are therefore not limited to tasks that
are commonly used in resource depletion studies, i.e.,“hot”tasks
thatrequirecontroloveremotionalresponses.Second,thepresent
results indicate that order is an important factor that should be
considered in experimental studies that employ a within sub-
jects design. That is, order may introduce variation that, if not
accounted for in the analysis, may lower the power of statisti-
cal tests. The present study demonstrates that it is very easy to
account for order, provided that one is willing to switch from
a regular repeated measurements ANOVA to a multilevel analy-
sis. Third, the ﬁnding that order has such a profound effect on
cognitive control performance, has important implications for
neuropsychological assessment, where patients often have to per-





populations characterized by motivational deﬁcits,for example in
children with ADHD (e.g., Slusarek et al.,2001).
To conclude, two explanations have been proposed for the
robust ﬁnding that repeated acts of cognitive control degrade per-
formance.Themuscleaccountstatesthatrepeatedactsofcognitive
control deplete resources, whereas the motivation account states
thatrepeatedactsof cognitivecontrolreducemotivationtomatch
allocated to required resources. Using a simple formal modeling
approach, we obtained more evidence for the motivation account
than for the muscle account. Therefore, we conclude that it is
likely that the effects of sequential cognitive control originate in
a reduced motivation to match allocated resources to required
resources.
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